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policy implications for the effectiveness of information messages in the pension domain. 
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Studies in household finance highlight individual heterogeneity in savings and household portfolio 
choices, including choices of pensions and other retirement saving products. Traditional explanations 
for the heterogeneity in participation in pension schemes rest on variation in socio-demographic 
attributes and economic and financial characteristics (e.g. Huberman et al. (2007) on the participation in 
Defined Contribution (401)k pension plans in the US, and Antolin (2008) on the participation in 
supplementary pension schemes for eight OECD countries). One strand of the literature specifically 
investigates the role of education, where low education in general and low financial education in 
particular are often found to have a negative impact on pension preparation; see, e.g., Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2006, 2011) for the US, Fornero and Monticone (2011) and Rinaldi (2011) for Italy, and 
Coppola and Lamla (2013) for Germany. Duflo and Saez (2003) find a small positive effect of 
information on participation in employer sponsored tax deferred accounts, and a larger effect of social 
interactions. Cappelletti et al. (2013) use Italian data and confirm the international evidence that 
individuals often lack basic knowledge of their complementary pension schemes, even those who 
participate in such a scheme: many participants cannot recall their investment strategy or the amount of 
their annuity. They also find that participation rates are particularly low among younger workers, 
typically those who would benefit most. Unsurprisingly, they find that income is the strongest predictor 
of participation, as individuals who earn more have more resources to subscribe. 
This paper analyses the heterogeneity in pension choices through the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM) proposed by American psychologists Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1983). ELM essentially models the elaboration process that occurs when attempting to 
change a person’s attitude through communication. The amount of elaboration or thinking is different for 
each individual and varies from low to high according to motivation and ability to process the message. 
When motivation and ability are high, individuals are inclined to take a “central route to persuasion”, 
otherwise they follow a “peripheral route to persuasion”. The ELM has often been used in marketing 
studies to explain consumer choices (Jae and Delvecchio, 2004; Petty and Rucker, 2006), but also 
lends itself for the analysis of other types of individual choices connected with a communication 
message. For example, it can be used to explain the heterogeneity in households’ financial portfolios, 
since in a given context, a specific (financial) advice can lead to different choices, depending on how 
the individual processes the message. The idea that not only cognitive skills, but also contextual 
elements can affect individual preferences and behavior over economic issues is in line with Hoff and 
Stiglitz (2016, p. 25), who maintain the need “to broaden economic discourse by importing insights into 
human behavior not just from psychology, but also from sociology and anthropology”.  
In particular, we use ELM to analyse the heterogeneity in pension choices connected to the 2007 
policy reform in Italy that allowed transferring future severance pay contributions into a pension fund. In 
fact, the reform was accompanied by an information campaign with a clear message that resembled an 
advertisement in favour of the pension fund choice. The aim of our paper is not to analyse the optimality 
of the decision, but rather the way in which individuals process the message they receive and the 
ultimate effectiveness of the government’s communication strategy. We use data from the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which includes a question on the choice 
concerning transferring the severance pay into a pension fund. We exploit information from four waves: 
one before (2006) and three after the reform (2008, 2010 and 2012). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the general structure of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model. Section 2 describes the Italian reform allowing the severance pay 
transfer into a pension fund, and its main message. While Section 3 describes the dataset, Section 4 
uses these data to assess the effectiveness of the reform message using the ELM. Section 5 presents 




1. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983), presented in 
Figure 1, is essentially a theory about the thinking processes that can occur when attempting to change 
a person’s attitude through communication. The ELM assumes that any one variable can influence 
attitudes in a number of different ways and that individuals can differ in how carefully and extensively 
they think about a message. In other words, in any given context, the amount of individual elaboration 
or thinking about a message or issue can vary from low to high along an “elaboration continuum”. The 
position along this continuum is determined by considering individuals’ motivation and ability to process 
the message presented to them. The concept of ‘motivation’ in the ELM consists in personal relevance 
of the issue, while ‘ability’ refers to resources and skills needed to understand and react to a message. 
Ability not only depends on intelligence, but also on time available or distraction in the communication 
environment. 
According to Petty and Cacioppo (1983), if motivation and ability to think are high, individuals are 
inclined to follow a central route to persuasion. Otherwise they follow a peripheral route to persuasion. 
In the central route, individuals carefully consider the elements of the message in order to determine 
whether its proposal makes sense and will be beneficial to them. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
if someone makes a decision through a central route, their changed attitude is relatively enduring, 
resistant to counter persuasion, and predictive of behaviour (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983; Jae and 
Delvecchio, 2004; Wilson, 2014). On the other hand, if a decision is based upon superficial elements, 
external context, or momentary feelings, then it is likely that the resultant peripheral attitude is 
temporary, sensitive to counter persuasion, and not predictive of behaviour. In this case it is likely that 
the message recipient will make a decision without undertaking the effort required to process merits 
and demerits in the message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983). 
 
2. The severance pay transfer into a pension fund: the Italian reform and its main message 
At the start of 1970s the Italian pension system was a mixed social system: a guaranteed minimum 
pension for all citizens, and a pension based on end-of-career earnings for workers in the public and 
private sectors, for employees as well as self-employed workers. The pension system was funded 
through a Pay-As-You-Go scheme, determining a substantial coverage intervention by the State. The 
progressive increase in average life expectancy, the falling birth rate, the huge government budget 
deficit, and the slowdown of economic growth made the Italian pension system unsustainable in the 
long term. For these reasons, it has been deeply modified since the early 1990s, through reforms aimed 
at improving its long-term sustainability and redressing its main problems (Fornero and Monticone, 
2011). These reforms implied that public pensions fell over time, so that future retirees will face the 
problem how to maintain their standard of living and finance their consumption after retirement. 
According to the State General Accounting Office’s estimates, the replacement rate of a private 
employee will decrease from about 74% in 2010 to 60-65% after 2040 (Ministry of Economics and 
Finance, 2014). To counteract this reduction, the Italian government introduced a non-compulsory 
(‘supplementary’) pension, in the form of participation in one or more pension funds. This implies that 
the new national pension scheme has two pillars: I) the Pay-As-You-Go compulsory pension, which 
remains the most important; and II) a non-compulsory pension funded through a Defined Contribution 
scheme.1 
 
                                                  
1 Actually there is a third pillar: the private pension, determined by voluntary savings. This entirely depends on individual 
responsibility and life-cycle choices, and is not imposed or recommended in any way by the State. 
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Figure 1 – The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion 
 
Source: Petty et al. (2009) 
 
In addition to pensions, private sector employees in Italy can rely on a severance pay (Tfr, 
Trattamento di fine rapporto) that depends on the length of the employment relationship in the same 
company and on the employee’s wage. To finance the Tfr, companies are forced to set aside a 
percentage of each employee’s gross annual salary (about 7.5%) on their annual budget. Since the 
severance pay (including a low inflation-based return) is due as a lump sum only at the end of the work 
relationship, it can be seen as a cheap loan from employee to employer. Indeed for this particular 
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funding source, companies have to set aside interest payments computed at the annual rate of 1.5% 
plus three quarters of the national inflation rate. 
Even though the supplementary pension scheme was introduced in 1992, participation in pension 
funds was much lower than in other developed countries (OECD, 2014).2 In order to speed up the 
development of the second pillar, in the same spirit as the Austrian Severance Pay Reform in 2002 
(Hofer, 2007), the Italian government decided in 2005 to allow employees to transfer their own future 
severance pay’s contributions into a pension fund as of January 1, 2007.3 This reform was motivated by 
the fact that pension funds generally have a higher return than the Tfr (considering an average inflation 
rate of about 2% during the decade 1997-2007, the average return of the non-transferred severance 
pay was equal to 1.5+0.75×2=3%). Moreover, contrary to the severance pay that is received as a lump 
sum, investments in pension funds can be converted into annuities at retirement. The Government’s 
objective was to stimulate the development of pension funds to ensure an increase in the income of 
future retirees. 
According to the reform, since January 1st 2007 all Italian employees in the private sector4 have to 
choose among three alternatives: i) to deposit their future severance pay contributions into a pension 
fund (the portion set aside up to 31 December 2006 remains in the company), ii) to leave the Tfr in their 
companies, or iii) an intermediate solution, with the restriction that at least 50% of severance pay then 
has to be directed into the pension fund. To further encourage participation in pension funds, the Italian 
government created tax incentives and a silence-as-assent mechanism. In fact, Italian employees have 
six months from the start of their job (or from the start of the law’s effectiveness) to communicate the 
decision of rejection or acceptance. If they do not respond, their severance pay is automatically 
transferred into a pension fund managed by the Italian National Institute of Social Security (Istituto 
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS). There are thus three possible scenarios: I) the employee 
decides not to give up the severance pay and denies the transfer into a pension fund; II) the employee 
consciously decides to transfer Tfr into a pension fund, giving up the severance pay at the end of the 
work relationship; III) the employee does not make a conscious decision and follows the default.5 Once 
the Tfr is transferred into a pension fund this is irrevocable; on the other hand, employees can always 
adhere to a fund later. 
Since the reform, there is a difference between firms with less than 50 and with at least 50 
employees in case the employee does not transfer the severance pay. Medium-large firms (50 or more 
employees) lost the opportunity to use the Tfr as a convenient financing source, since the future Tfr 
payments are managed by the Italian National Institute of Social Security. Smaller firms (less than 50 
employees) on the other hand can still take advantage of the severance pay of employees who do not 
transfer their Tfr into a pension fund. Employers of smaller firms therefore had an incentive to stimulate 
their employees to deny the Tfr transfer. 
Summing up, in terms of the ELM architecture, what is the ‘message’ that the Italian government 
wanted to give through the 2007 reform? The content of a law is generally not easy to understand for 
the average individual. Moreover, laws are generally not formulated to involve or motivate people. This 
definitely also applies to the law on the pension reform (Legislative Decree no. 252/2005), which has 
the generic heading «Regulation of non-compulsory pension schemes». Furthermore, the identity of the 
sender of the message transmitted via law is unclear. Although the political responsibility of a law 
belongs to the government that writes it, for citizens it is difficult to understand who is specifically asking 
them to make the Tfr choice. The credibility of the law message is mainly determined by the 
                                                  
2 Torricelli et al. (2016) investigate possible causes for low participation.  
3 The reform is contained in the Legislative Decree no. 252/2005, supplemented by Law no. 296/2006 and Legislative 
Decree no. 28/2007. 
4 Since 2010 this reform also involved public employees hired after January 1, 2001. However, since this category is very 
small and the reform has different rules regarding public employees, we only consider employees in private sector. 
5 To simplify, we consider the so-called ‘intermediate’ cases, those in which the employee decides to transfer only a part 
of his/her severance pay, in the same way as those in which the employee decides to entirely transfer his/her Tfr. 
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government (or the Prime Minister or the Minister of Labour and Welfare State), though other 
stakeholders (e.g. unions, banks, representatives of employers and politicians) could influence the law’s 
consequences, blurring or smoothing the initial idea of the reform. To deal with these issues and «to 
guarantee employees the possibility to choose and to determine their future consciously» (Damiano, 
2007), and given the reform’s importance, the Italian government decided in 2007 to communicate the 
message of the law through all available channels: many public and private TV channels addressed the 
reform in their talk shows; a specific hotline and a specific website were created for questions of 
citizens; a daily information event was broadcasted on the main public TV channel (RAI 1). Obviously, 
there were reform opponents but they represented a minority and were not associated with the 
message sender. 
Relying on many different sources (literature, publications, and media), we believe the message can 
be synthetized as follows: “Pension funds plus tax incentives linked to them can guarantee a higher 
retirement income than the severance pay (Tfr)”. A key characteristic of the reform message is that it is 
silent about several fundamental aspects of the employee’s choice. For example, it does not mention 
the fact that the higher return of pension funds is connected to higher risk, that tax incentives can 
change over time (regardless of their choice), or that the Tfr transfer is irrevocable. The choice of the 
message wording is supported by the well-known fact that only a small percentage of potential 
beneficiaries have full knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of the reform while most were 
completely unaware of these. Most information was given by potential beneficiaries of the reform by 
means of publications (books, articles), union meetings and TV shows. Moreover, in terms of written 
documents, private employees received the appropriate forms needed to make their decision on 
pension funds, without any information helping them to make the decision more consciously. 
Consequently, the message and the forms to formalize the decision were often not received at the 
same time. In other words, it is likely that many beneficiaries of the 2007 reform did not really receive 
the message, regardless of their motivation or ability. 
The reform was essentially meant to use the severance pay (and related tax benefits) to create 
pension fund investments for employees so as to help them cope with a decreasing public pension in 
the future through a secondary pension income. In the end, given the message content and the 
irrevocable nature of the Tfr transfer decision when positive, the attitude change desired by the Italian 
government was intended to be permanent. 
 
3. Data and sample 
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is a large biennial representative survey of the 
Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy. For each household member, the SHIW provides 
demographic information (age, level of education, gender and marital status), economic information at 
the household level including net wealth (real and financial assets net of financial liabilities) and the 
amounts invested in a variety of financial assets. Moreover Bank of Italy’s survey contains questions on 
individuals’ financial literacy and knowledge of pension funds. 
Since the 2008 wave the survey includes a question on the choice to transfer future severance pay 
contributions into a pension fund. Specifically, the text of the question to private sector employees is: 
“Has your severance pay fund been transferred to some form of supplementary pension scheme 
 (pension fund or private retirement plan)?” ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Do not know’ 
The presence of the ‘Do not know’ option means that respondents are not forced to pick an answer, 
minimizing guessing. In spite of this, there is also item nonresponse (i.e. people who did not answer the 
question at all), possibly due to low consciousness of the pension situation, unwillingness to declare 
information about wealth (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993; D’Alessio and Faiella, 2002), or because there 
was no explicit option for refusing to answer. 
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We use the longitudinal component of SHIW to build a four waves balanced panel from 2006 to 
2012. The complete panel consists of 6,419 individuals (belonging to 2,767 households) for a total of 
25,676 observations. However, only 65.9% of people in the sample were aged 16-65 in 2006 and, 
among them, 38.3% were employed in 2012, and almost two thirds of them only worked in the private 
sector. Selecting those who were employed in the private sector in 2012 and were 16-65 years old in 
2006 (i.e. people who were already of working age at the moment of message communication), leads to 
a data set of 1,125 individuals (belonging to 887 households). The data show that many answers to the 
Tfr transfer question change over the 2008-2012 period, either because the ‘No’ response is revocable 
or because people gave the wrong answer. Moreover, although phrasing of question about the Tfr 
transfer remained the same, the interviewers gave more and more attention to this question, improving 
its reliability and reducing missing values over time. For these reasons, we decided to consider 
employees’ answers declared in the 2012 survey only, and to drop the 55 observations with a missing 
answer in 2012.6 We also drop those who chose to transfer their Tfr into a pension fund and then 
declared not to have a pension fund in 2012 (7 observations), given the inconsistency between these 
answers. Our final data set thus consists of 1,063 individuals; 15% of them declared in 2012 they had 
transferred their severance pay into a pension fund, 73% declared they had not, and 12% declared ‘Do 
not know’.  
We use specific survey questions asked at least once between 2006 and 2012 to define risk aversion, 
preference for short run (impatience), preference for lump sum, financial literacy, and pension fund 
participation. 
To measure risk aversion, we use a question about the preference for financial investments 
collected in each survey. We define individuals to have low risk aversion if they prefer investments that 
offer very high returns with high risk of losing part of the capital, and to have high risk aversion if they 
prefer investments that offer low or fair returns with no risk or a good degree of protection for the 
invested capital. 
To measure impatience (preference for short run income), we use a question collected in the 2010 
survey only. We define someone as preferring the short run when they declare that, if they won a lottery 
with prize equal to the annual household disposable income postponed by one year, they would give up 
at least 10% of this prize to receive it immediately. 
Preference for lump sum is based on a question collected in the 2008 survey only, asking individuals 
to assume they are 65 years old and receive a total pension income of 1,000 euros a month adjusted 
for inflation. We define preference for lump sum (instead of an annuity) if they declare they would give 
up half of this annual pension (to be paid for the rest of their life) in exchange for a lump sum of 100,000 
euros to be paid immediately. 
To measure financial literacy, we follow Fornero and Monticone (2011), using three standard 
questions in the SHIW survey measuring respondents’ understanding of inflation, diversification in 
investment strategies, and riskiness of financial assets. Over the period we analyse, the survey 
contains financial literacy questions only in 2006 and 2008. However, in 2006 they were asked only to 
half of the sample (randomly selected). Thus, we decided to measure financial literacy using the 
questions in SHIW 2008.  
Finally, pension fund participation is defined on the basis of a question in which individuals have to 
declare whether or not they have ever made any payment into a personal retirement plan or 
supplementary pension fund (also considering the Tfr transfer to a pension plan). 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the employees in the sample obtained 
in 2006, i.e. before the reform, and in 2012, according the answer provided to the 2012 Tfr transfer 
question. Column (1) highlights that in 2006, about 41.5% of the sample are women, and 95.7% are 
                                                  
6 Alternatively we could have included missing values and interpreted them as ‘Do not know’ responses. We tested 
robustness of our final results against this alternative – it does not change the conclusions of the analysis (results 
available upon request). 
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Italian citizens. 49.8% of the respondents live in the North, 20.2% in the Centre and the remaining 
30.0% in the South. Almost half of the employees live in towns or cities with more than 40,000 
inhabitants, while 29.0% live in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Average age is 38.4 
years, 47.6% of the total sample completed high school, and only 7.7% have a university degree. The 
average number of household members is 3.46, 62.7% of the respondents are married, and 31.2% are 
single. In the sub-sample of employees, 47.8% have a time-to-retirement (i.e. the remaining number of 
years to reach retirement)7 between 15 and 30 years, while 27.9% have time-to-retirement at most 15 
years. The group with time-to-retirement larger than 30, which is the group which should have the 
highest interest in the reform content, represents 24.4% of the sample. Most employees (63.7%) work 
in small companies (with less than 50 employees), whereas about 26.1% worked in large companies 
(with at least 100 employees). The mean expected retirement replacement rate is equal to 64.1%. In 
the complete sample, average household income in 2006 is €38,500 and average household wealth is 
€249,000. Table 1 shows that Italians are very risk averse: only 1.1% prefer investments with high 
levels of risk and return, while 83.9% prefer low returns and low or no risk. Moreover, before the reform 
only 9.8% of the sample participated in a pension fund. 
Comparing columns (3)-(5) in Table 1 reveals differences across the three groups with different 
severance pay responses, especially between ‘Yes’ and the other two (‘No’ and ‘Don’t know’).8 The 
‘Yes’ group is composed mainly of men, living in the North, married, with higher education, and higher 
average household income than the other groups. Most notably they are older, which is contrary to 
expectations, since the higher pension fund returns pay off particularly in the long run. On the other 
hand, the average age of employees who answer ‘Do not know’ is lower than in the total sample, 
suggesting a greater lack of interest among young people. According to Pettigrew et al. (2007), a 
possible explanation is that young people, regardless their education level, have a strong sense of 
‘living for today’, with a low interest in financial planning and a poor understanding of available pension 
options. Given the strong correlation between time-to-retirement and age, it is not surprising that the 
same result holds for time-to-retirement. The ‘Do not know’ group has the highest average household 
wealth, in line with the findings of Cannari and D’Alessio (1993) and D’Alessio and Faiella (2002) 
discussed above.  
Another interesting difference among the three groups is in the size of the firm where respondents 
work. This is probably connected to the factors discussed above: different regulations in case of 
transfer denial according to firm size (see Section 2) and the presence of unions. Most people in the 
‘Yes’ group work in companies with more than 100 employees where unionization rates are higher, 
while ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’ individuals more often work in companies with less than 50 employees. It 
is plausible that in the latter two cases, employees were not adequately informed, or were pushed by 
their employers to deny the severance pay transfer, so that the firm retained a cheap financing source. 
This may happen regardless of the employees’ involvement in message content or ability to process it, 
compromising the individual decision process. 
Table 1 also shows that employees who decided to transfer their Tfr into a pension fund have higher 
pension fund participation and more knowledge of their future pension income: they have the lowest 
percentage that did not report their expected replacement rate in 2012. There is no significant 
difference between the three groups in terms of the level of the average expected replacement rate, risk 
aversion, or preference for the short run or for lump sum. 
 
                                                  
7 The time-to-retirement is calculated as the difference between 40 (necessary number of contribution years to retire) and 
the current number of contribution years. 
8 The following differences are significant at the 1% level: age, marital status, education level, area, time-to-retirement, 
company size, household income, unknown replacement rate, financial literacy, and pension fund participation. 
Citizenship and gender are significant at the 5% level. Household wealth is significant at the 10% level. Van Rooij and 





Table 1 – Sample means by year and by 2012 Tfr choice 
Variables 
2006 2012 
Total sample Total sample Yes No Do not Know 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observations 1,063 1,063 161 775 127 
Female 41.5% 41.5% 34.2% 43.7% 37.0% 
Age (in years) 38.4 44.4 46.8 44.4 41.1 
Italian 95.7% 96.0% 99.4% 95.1% 96.9% 
Marital status           
Married 62.7% 62.6% 74.5% 63.9% 39.4% 
Single 31.2% 29.8% 19.9% 28.5% 50.4% 
Divorced 5.2% 6.3% 5.0% 5.9% 10.2% 
Widow 0.8% 1.3% 0.6% 1.7% 0.0% 
Education level           
Primary 6.6% 5.7% 1.2% 7.1% 3.1% 
Lower secondary 38.1% 34.4% 24.8% 36.8% 32.3% 
Secondary 47.6% 49.0% 59.6% 46.7% 49.6% 
Tertiary 7.7% 10.8% 14.3% 9.4% 15.0% 
Area           
North 49.8% 49.8% 62.7% 48.0% 44.1% 
Centre 20.2% 20.2% 22.4% 19.4% 22.8% 
South 30.0% 30.0% 14.9% 32.6% 33.1% 
Size of municipality           
< 20,000 inhabitants 29.0% 29.0% 29.2% 28.0% 34.6% 
20,000 - 40,000 22.0% 21.5% 16.1% 23.7% 15.0% 
40,000 - 500,000 44.0% 44.5% 47.2% 43.6% 46.5% 
> 500,000 5.0% 5.0% 7.5% 4.6% 3.9% 
Household size (#) 3.46 3.32 3.34 3.34 3.21 
Time-to-retirement group           
Time-to-ret. > 30 24.4% 21.6% 11.9% 22.0% 32.0% 
16-30 47.8% 38.2% 33.1% 39.0% 40.0% 
Time-to-ret. ≤ 15 27.9% 40.2% 55.0% 39.0% 28.0% 
Company size           
Employees ≤ 15 
63.7% 
46.6% 13.0% 53.5% 46.5% 
16-49 18.2% 13.7% 18.1% 24.4% 
50-99 10.2% 7.4% 12.4% 7.0% 3.9% 
Employees ≥ 100 26.1% 27.8% 60.9% 21.4% 25.2% 
Expected replacement rate 64.1% 62.5% 63.3% 61.9% 65.7% 
Unknown replacement rate - 45.1% 27.3% 45.9% 62.2% 
Disposable household income (€) 38,455 41,811 50,373 39,523 44,918 
Household wealth (€) 248,786 259,334 303,232 236,920 340,466 
Risk aversion           
Low 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 0.5% 0.8% 
Medium 15.0% 8.9% 8.7% 9.3% 7.1% 
High 83.9% 90.4% 90.1% 90.2% 92.1% 
Preference for short run 1 - 33.3% 29.8% 35.4% 26.0% 
Preference for lump sum 2 - 63.6% 58.2% 64.2% 70.0% 
Financial literacy 2 - 60.4% 73.9% 59.6% 47.2% 
Pension fund participation in 2006 9.8% 9.8% 26.7% 6.3% 9.4% 
Pension fund participation in 2012 - 24.3% 100.0% 11.5% 6.3% 
Note: 1 Evaluated in 2010; 2 Evaluated in 2008. Statistics refer to the total sample except for t ime-
to-retirement, company size, expected replacement rate, and unknown replacement rate which are 
defined for employees only. Means of dummy variables are expressed as a percentage and in ital ics. 
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Table 2 – Determinants of Tfr transfer: Logit marginal effects 









        
Female -0.0525** No. Employees ≤ 15 -0.1923*** 
Age < 35 -0.0594 15 < No. Empl. < 50 -0.0998** 
Age 35-45 -0.0261 No. Employees ≥ 100 0.0402 
Age 45-55 0.0528 Medium income 0.1048** 
Married 0.0176 High income 0.1069** 
High school 0.0660** Medium wealth 0.0118 
University 0.0746* High wealth 0.0239 
Center -0.0369 High risk aversion -0.0140 
South -0.0645** Preference for short run 0.0099 
Small municipality 0.0514 Financial literacy 0.0354 
Big municipality 0.0503*     
No. household comp. -0.0108     
Observations 936 Pseudo R-squared 0.215 
Log Likelihood -337.2     
Note: All  variables refer to 2012, except for financial l i teracy (to 2008) and preference for short run 
(to 2010). Robust standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Average Marginal Effects. 
Table 2 presents the marginal effects of a logit model explaining whether the Tfr choice answer was 
“Yes” or “no” (‘Do not know’ answers are excluded). For a detailed description of each variable see 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. Results confirm descriptive conclusions and show, for example, that there is 
a strong positive association between firm size and the decision to transfer. This association is much 
stronger than the association between Tfr choice and variables like income, education, or financial 
literacy. 
Summing up, this preliminary evidence highlights that the decision to transfer the severance pay into 
a pension fund was mainly taken by more educated and older individuals, with high household income. 
Since the reform was mainly directed at low income and younger individuals, this result calls for a better 
understanding of the type of elaboration process fostered by the communication campaign that 
accompanied the reform. This is the topic of the next two sections. 
 
4. An assessment of the effectiveness of the reform message based on ELM 
In order to develop an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the reform message, we put the 
Tfr transfer decision in the traditional ELM scheme. As highlighted by Figure 2, the ELM works through 
a step-by-step sequence, where the message represents the starting point, each intermediate step 
(boxes A, B, C, D, and G) is a specific condition, and the concluding steps (boxes E, F, and H) 
represent three possible outcomes. For each step in Figure 2, we will use a proxy variable based upon 
what is observed in the data. 
The first step is to assess the employee’s involvement in the message content (box A in Figure 2). 
We consider as involved or motivated those who respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question about the Tfr 
transfer into a pension fund, showing they remember their choice at the time of the survey. Indeed, 
those who do not know or do not remember their response after some time (possibly only a few 
months), will probably not be interested in the message content. Accordingly, 88% of the sample are 
involved (73% answer ‘No’ and 15% ‘Yes’, see Section 3), while the remaining 12% are not (the ‘Do not 
know’ answers in Table 1). 
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Figure 2 – The employee’s decision process through the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
 




Even if involved and motivated, an employee must have the necessary ability to process the 
message (box B in Figure 2). We define the ability to process using four specific questions, included in 
the 2008 survey only, about the possible advantages of pension fund saving after the 2007 reform. The 
precise wording of these four questions is given below. 
(1) Pension funds enjoy tax benefits compared to a mutual fund. 
True/False/Do not know. 
(2) When you retire, you can withdraw part of the invested capital. 
True/False/ Do not know. 
(3) There are pension funds with guaranteed minimum returns. 
True/False/Do not know. 
(4) Pension funds guarantee a fixed percentage of the last salary. 
True/False/Do not know. 
Table 3 shows that only few respondents have a good knowledge of pension funds functioning and 
the reform. Only 4.0% correctly answered all four questions, while 33.7% did not answer even one 
question correctly. The questions with most (45.2% and 43.2%) are the ones on the possibility of 
withdrawing part of the capital at retirement and the existence of pension funds with guaranteed 
minimum returns. Only 31.1% know about tax benefits introduced by the 2007 reform, and only 25.4% 
know that pension funds do not guarantee a fixed percentage of the final salary. We define respondents 
as able to process the message content if they correctly answered at least two questions out of four. 
 
Table 3 – Statistics of the pension fund knowledge questions. Year 2008 
Question 1 (%) 
No. of correct 
answers 
% of sample 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 68.9 
Correct 31.1 
Question 2 (%) 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 54.8 0 33.7 
Correct 45.2 1 17.5 
Question 3 (%) 2 23.0 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 56.8 3 21.8 
Correct 43.2 4 4.0 
Question 4 (%) 
Total 
(N = 1,063) 




The sample can now be divided into four groups: people who are not involved and not able to 
process the message content (6.9% of the sample); people who are not involved but able (5.1%); 
people who are involved but not able (44.3%); and people who are both involved and able (43.7%). 
According to the ELM structure only the last group of employees can proceed to step C (and, possibly, 
get to the central route). 
If the employee does not have the necessary involvement or ability, the next step is to assess the 
presence of contextual elements influencing the decision (box G in Figure 2). For this purpose, we 
consider whether participation in a pension fund (as defined in Section 3, i.e., any payments into a 
personal retirement plan or supplementary pension fund including the Tfr transfer to a pension plan) 
changed from 2006 to 2012. Indeed, in a scenario without any peripheral influence, it is plausible that 
people will retain their initial (i.e. 2006) attitude, so that they will still participate in a pension fund in 
2012 if they did so in 2006 and vice versa (box H in Figure 2). In contrast, a change in 2012 with 
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respect to their initial attitude (i.e., initial participation) signals the influence of contextual elements on 
the employee’s behaviour, triggering a ‘peripheral route’ (box F in Figure 2). 
An alternative proxy for box G may be the positive response about the Tfr transfer. Nevertheless it 
represents a sub-sample of the chosen one (i.e. pension fund participation), because people can 
change their pension fund participation without transferring any severance pay contributions and using 
Tfr transfers would reduce the number of participation changes. 
Examples of contextual elements that can influence the employee’s choice, are the presence of 
unions at the workplace or the role of media. Several unions decided to sponsor specific occupational 
pension funds inside the workplace. Moreover, especially in 2007, the media (TV, newspapers, radio, 
websites, etc.) massively reported potential positive and negative effects of the controversial reform. 
Another contextual element is the number of employees in the firm, since, as discussed in Section 2, 
small firms had an incentive to make their employees deny the Tfr transfer. 
For employees motivated and able to process the message, we have to check whether, after 
scrutinizing the message and collecting all necessary information, they change their attitude towards 
pension fund participation (box C in Figure 2). We use a change in pension fund participation from 2006 
to 2012 as a signal of attitude change (as for box G). 
According to the theory of Petty and Cacioppo (1983), motivation and ability are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for following a central route. Even if employees are motivated and able to 
understand the message content, their attitude towards and participation in pension funds may be 
affected by positive or negative cues, contextual elements, or heuristics that may trigger a quick 
decision through a peripheral route (box F in Figure 2). To make sure that message processing 
followed the central route, we check whether the change in their pension fund participation persists in 
the long-term (box D in Figure 2). If the change is permanent (at least until 2012),9 then we conclude 
that the employee made the choice to follow a central route (box E in Figure 2). 
We assess the presence of a long-term change in an employee’s cognitive structure by checking 
whether the change in pension fund participation from 2006 to 2012 is consistent with the response 
about the severance pay transfer. In particular, there is consistency if a ‘Yes’ response to the Tfr 
question is accompanied by a positive change in pension fund participation (i.e. the respondent did not 
have a pension fund in 2006, but has one in 2012) or the ‘No’ response goes together with a negative 
change in pension fund participation (i.e. the respondent had a pension fund in 2006, but not in 2012). 
In the former case consistency is obvious, since if employees decide not to deny the transfer of the 
severance pay, they will surely have a pension fund in 2012. In the latter case the decision may be 
driven by a higher consciousness of some negative characteristics of investing in a pension fund (e.g. 
higher riskiness). In sum, if there is no consistency, a peripheral route (box F in Figure 2) must have 
been followed since the participation change was not really conscious; otherwise, employees probably 
followed a central route (box E in Figure 2) and their attitude change is permanent. 
A complete representation of how individuals pass through the ELM scheme in Figure 2 is shown in 
Figure 3. Starting from a total sample of 1.063 employees, Figure 3 highlights that, after the reform 
message, only 236 employees changed their pension fund participation (86 via a central route, 150 via 
a peripheral route), while 827 retained their initial attitude. However, the ELM scheme allows splitting 
individuals who retained the initial attitude in two different categories. In fact, 40.4% of them (334 
observations) consciously retained their attitude, based on motivation and ability to scrutinize the 
message, whereas the remaining 493 did not make a conscious decision, due to lack of motivation or 
ability. 
 
                                                  
9 In a robustness check, we find that an extension of the reference period from 2006-2012 to 2006-2014 
hardly change the results (Section 5.1). 
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Figure 3 – Sample distribution in the ELM scheme 
 
 
Summing up, in this analysis we define people as conscious decision makers if their decision is 
based on motivation and ability to process, independently of the change of pension fund participation, 
and if a change of attitude is permanent. According to this classification, 420 employees (39.5% of the 
sample) can be considered as taking a conscious decision while 643 took an unconscious decision. 
These two ways to categorize employees represent our two dependent variables in the econometric 
analysis. The first variable is a multinomial variable, which can assume three unordered values (one for 
each ELM outcome: change through central route, change through peripheral route, retain initial 
attitude), while the second one is a binary variable (conscious or unconscious decision). 
 
4.1. A closer look at the data on the ELM steps 
Table 4 reports the Tfr choice and pension fund participation in 2006 and 2012 by motivation and 
ability. It highlights that 64.0% of those who answered ‘Yes’ can be considered both motivated and able 
to process, compared to 46.7% of those who denied the transfer. Table 4 also shows that 42.1% of 
those with a ‘No – Yes’ change of pension fund participation from 2006 to 2012 were not really involved 
in the message content or not able to correctly scrutinize it, implying they were influenced by a 
peripheral process (Step G in Figure 2). Among the 113 motivated and able employees reporting a ‘No 
– Yes’ participation change, 45 respondents did not transfer their severance pay. Despite this, they can 
be considered as ‘success cases’ of the 2007 reform in terms of the attitude change aimed for by the 
Italian government (i.e. investing in a pension fund to better cope with a lower public pension in the 
future). In fact, they decided to participate in a pension fund even though according to the ELM they 
followed a peripheral route. 
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Table 4 – Tfr choice and change in pension fund participation by motivation  
and ability to process (Relative frequencies calculated with respect to the total sample) 
Choice about the 
Tfr Transfer 
Change in Pension Fund Participation (2006 – 2012) 
Total 
No – No No – Yes Yes – No Yes – Yes 
People with no motivation or no ability (or neither) 
Yes 
0 50 0 8 58 
0.0% 42.4% 0.0% 18.6% 36.0% 
No 
372 26 13 2 413 
56.8% 36.6% 41.9% 11.1% 53.3% 
Do not know 
109 6 10 2 127 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
481 82 23 12 598 
63.0% 42.1% 56.1% 19.0% 56.3% 
People with both motivation and ability 
Yes 
0 68 0 35 103 
0.0% 57.6% 0.0% 81.4% 64.0% 
No 
283 45 18 16 362 
43.2% 63.4% 58.1% 88.9% 46.7% 
Do not know 
0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 
283 113 18 51 465 
37.0% 57.9% 43.9% 81.0% 43.7% 
Note: ‘No’ means no participation, ‘Yes’ means participation, hence No-No and Yes-Yes 
correspond to no change in pension fund participation. 
As discussed above, the implementation of an ELM model provides three possible outcomes: I) 
individuals change their initial attitude about pension fund following a central route (CR); II) individuals 
change their initial attitude following a peripheral route (PR), not really taking a conscious decision; III) 
individuals retain their initial attitude (RIA). Table 5 highlights that the most common ELM outcome is 
the third one, showing a very high reluctance of Italians to change their participation in pension funds 
(77.8%). Among people who changed their participation, the most common route was the peripheral 
one (14.1% of the sample). This may have happened because the message was not clearly explained 
or correctly provided, and also because the majority of employees did not have the necessary 
motivation or ability to make a well-reasoned decision about such a complex subject. This creates the 
opportunity for contextual stakeholders (e.g. employers and unions) to significantly influence the private 
employees. Only a small part of population (8.1%) consciously changed their pension fund participation. 












Central Route Change 
68 18 0 86 
42.2% 2.3% 0.0% 8.1% 
Peripheral Route Change 
50 84 16 150 
31.1% 10.8% 12.6% 14.1% 
Retain Initial Attitude 
43 673 111 827 
26.7% 86.8% 87.4% 77.8% 
Total 
161 775 127 1,063 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Regarding the ELM outcomes by Tfr choice group, retaining initial attitude was the most common 
outcome in the ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’ groups, while employees who answered ‘Yes’ retained their 
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initial attitude only in 26.7% of cases (Table 5). Among respondents answering ‘Yes’ to the Tfr transfer 
question, 42.2% have reached a central route change, while the remaining group is characterized by a 
peripheral route change or retained the initial attitude. The peripheral route represents the most 
common route among those who decided to change their pension fund participation either positively or 
negatively (Table 6). In fact only 34.9% of those with a ‘No – Yes’ participation change followed a 
central route, compared to 43.9% of those who negatively changed their participation. 








Change in Pension Fund Participation (2006 - 2012) 
Total 
No - No No - Yes Yes - No Yes - Yes 
Central Route Change 
0 68 18 0 86 
0.0% 34.9% 43.9% 0.0% 8.1% 
Peripheral Route Change 
0 127 23 0 150 
0.0% 65.1% 56.1% 0.0% 14.1% 
Retain Initial Attitude 
764 0 0 63 827 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 77.8% 
Total 
764 195 41 63 1,063 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Note: No: no participation; Yes: participation. Hence No-No and Yes-Yes correspond to no 
change. 
 
5. Regression models of the ELM outcomes  
To get insight in how the most important steps of the ELM scheme (the intermediate ELM 
outcomes), relate to characteristics of the employees and their firms, Table 7 presents the marginal 
effects according to Logit models explaining motivation, ability to process, pension fund participation, 
and a positive change in pension fund participation between 2006 and 2012. For a detailed description 
of each variable see Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
The first two columns of Table 7 show the results for motivation – the binary variable with value 0 if 
the Tfr transfer answer is ‘Do not know’ and 1 if it is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ – and ability – the binary indicator for 
ability to process (or pension fund knowledge). As expected, motivation is low for the youngest age 
group and increases with financial literacy. As for the ability to process, keeping other characteristics 
constant, pension fund knowledge is positively related to financial literacy and education level. 
Moreover, it appears to be significantly higher among high income individuals and individuals living in 
larger cities. As expected, pension fund knowledge is negatively associated with impatience 
(“Preference for short run”). It is also positively related to risk aversion, suggesting that risk averse 
individuals put more effort in retirement planning. 
Column 3 in Table 7 shows which individual characteristics drive pension fund participation in 2012, 
whereas column 4 shows, for those who did not participate in 2006, what drives their chances to start 
participating between 2006 and 2012. These columns do not condition on involvement or ability to 
process. As expected, participation in a pension fund and joining a pension fund are positively related 
to age, education, income, and financial literacy. The most interesting thing here, however, is the 
relation to firm size: employees in small firms are less likely to participate in or join a pension fund than 
employees in larger firms. This is in line with the difference in incentives for small and large firms 




Table 7 – Determinants of motivation, ability to process, pension fund participation, and 
positive change in pension fund participation from 2006 to 2012: Logit marginal effects 







in Pension Fund 
Participation 
          
Female 0.0236 -0.0022 -0.0484* -0.0174 
Age < 35 -0.0546 0.0061 -0.0784 -0.0318 
Age 35-45 -0.0729** 0.0144 0.0426 0.0437 
Age 45-55 -0.0398 0.0382 0.0794** 0.0613 
Married 0.0917*** 0.1289*** 0.0215 0.0313 
High school 0.0083 0.1030*** 0.0754*** 0.0591** 
University -0.0246 0.1950*** 0.0853* 0.0774* 
Center -0.0414 0.0245 -0.0384 -0.0196 
South -0.0424 -0.0397 -0.0175 0.0101 
Small municipality -0.0621** 0.0718* 0.0618* 0.0549 
Big municipality -0.0394 0.0924** 0.0448 0.0228 
No. household components 0.0130 -0.0326** -0.0259* -0.0153 
No. Employees ≤ 15 -0.0751 0.0440 -0.1500*** -0.1516*** 
15 < No. Employees < 50 -0.1320** 0.0397 -0.0822* -0.0730 
No. Employees ≥ 100 -0.0854* 0.0797 0.0682* 0.0554 
Medium income -0.0131 0.0278 0.0695 0.0713* 
High income -0.0230 0.1684*** 0.0897** 0.0739* 
Medium wealth 0.0057 0.0698* -0.0231 -0.0221 
High wealth 0.0049 0.0399 0.0399 0.0250 
High risk aversion 0.0208 0.1755*** -0.0483 -0.0933* 
Preference for short run 0.0493** -0.0927*** -0.0183 -0.0190 
Financial literacy 0.0682*** 0.1042*** 0.0524** 0.0245 
      
Observations 1,063 1,063 1,063 959 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0919 0.116 0.146 0.116 
Log Likelihood -353.2 -650.9 -502.9 -427.9 
Note: All  variables refer to 2012, except for f inancial l i teracy (to 2008) and preference for short run 
(to 2010). Robust standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Average Marginal Effects; in column 
4, ‘Yes-No’ and ‘Yes-Yes’ cases of change in pension fund participation are excluded. 
In order to evaluate the impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on the probability 
that an employee follows a specific ELM route or takes a conscious decision, we estimate a Multinomial 
Logit Model (MLM) for the ELM outcomes and a (binary) Logit Model for the consciousness of decision, 
both by the standard maximum likelihood procedure. 
The model specification for the ELM outcome of individual i is as follows: 
∗ 	  
   	if	 ∗ ∗ 	for ; 	 , 1,2,3 
~ 1 ,	independent of , , , , . 
 Here ELM can have three values, representing the three possible (unordered) ELM outcomes (CR, 
PR, or RIA), X I is a vector of individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status, and education 
level), X H is a vector of household characteristics of the employee (area of residence, size of the 
municipality of residence, number of household components), X W represents the company size, X IW is 
a vector of household income and wealth information, and X F is a vector of individual economic and 
financial information (risk aversion, preference for short period investments, and financial literacy). For 
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a detailed description of each variable see Table A.1 in the Appendix. The base outcome in the 
Multinomial Logit estimation is the third one: retaining initial attitude (RIA). 
In addition, we estimate the probability of taking a conscious decision in 2012 using the following 
binary logit model: 
∗ 	  
1 ∗ 0 ;	 ~ , independent of , , , , . 
Here DC is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if decision is conscious and 0 otherwise. The 
regressors are the same as those in the multinomial logit model. 
Table 8 reports the estimated marginal effects on the probabilities of the three ELM outcomes 
(Multinomial Logit) in columns (1)-(3) and on the consciousness of the decision (Logit) in column (4). 
Results show a strong positive impact of education and being married on both the probability to 
consciously change initial attitude (CR) and on decision consciousness (DC). The size of the company 
has a significant effect on the ELM outcome, in line with the institutional difference that makes it 
attractive for firms with less than 50 workers to discourage their workers to transfer their severance pay: 
indeed, employees in small firms have a much lower probability to choose CR than employees in larger 
firms. Employees in very small firms are particularly likely not to change their initial attitude. Employees 
in large companies may also have received more and better information about pension funds and 
reform objectives thanks to information meetings organized by unions. 
Living in a small municipality is associated with a higher probability to change their participation in 
pension funds via a PR. Living in the South has a strongly significant negative effect on decision 
consciousness, but regional dummies are not significant when looking at determinants of CR. While 
wealth does not affect the decision process, income levels have some effect: medium income is 
associated with a higher probability of a PR change than low income, while high income is negatively 
associated to retaining initial attitude and positively to making a conscious decision. As expected, 
having a high risk aversion prevents from peripheral changes in the decision, and increases both the 
probability of retaining the initial attitude and, particularly, the probability to make a conscious decision. 
Finally, financial literacy is positively associated with the probability to follow a CR and with decision 
consciousness. 
Our results show that, once other individual and household features are accounted for, gender does 
not matter either in changing pension fund participation or in consciousness of the decision process 
(and neither in the ability to process as reported in column (2) of Table 7). This may seem to contradict 
some studies in household finance highlighting that women have a higher probability to be financially 
excluded (Lusardi et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 2011; Fornero and Monticone, 2011), but note that the 
gender effect keeps financial literacy constant. Age is also not significantly associated to the decision 
outcome, contrary to the reform objective that was primarily directed towards younger generations. 
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Table 8 – Determinants of the ELM outcomes (Multinomial Logit)  
and of the decision consciousness (Logit): marginal effects  
  
VARIABLES 













          
Female -0.0003 -0.0014 0.0017 -0.0003 
Age < 35 0.0049 -0.0445 0.0395 -0.0372 
Age 35-45 -0.0088 0.0532 -0.0444 -0.0513 
Age 45-55 0.0187 0.0136 -0.0323 0.0029 
Married 0.0476* 0.0043 -0.0518 0.1391*** 
High school 0.0517** 0.0279 -0.0795*** 0.0852** 
University 0.0885*** -0.0004 -0.0881* 0.1607*** 
Center 0.0004 -0.0098 0.0094 0.0216 
South -0.0302 0.0433 -0.0131 -0.0968*** 
Small municipality -0.0056 0.0637** -0.0580 0.0155 
Big municipality -0.0134 0.0252 -0.0118 0.0572 
No. household components 0.0008 -0.0104 0.0096 -0.0052 
No. Employees ≤ 15 -0.0627** -0.0569 0.1197*** 0.0215 
15 < No. Employees < 50 -0.0667* 0.0199 0.0468 -0.0918 
No. Employees ≥ 100 -0.0017 0.0434 -0.0417 0.0173 
Medium income -0.0403 0.0914** -0.0511 0.0121 
High income 0.0478 0.0350 -0.0828* 0.1146*** 
Medium wealth -0.0099 -0.0178 0.0276 0.0709* 
High wealth -0.0114 0.0218 -0.0103 0.0320 
High risk aversion 0.0285 -0.1367** 0.1082* 0.2224*** 
Preference for short run 0.0020 -0.0263 0.0242 -0.0270 
Financial literacy 0.0431** -0.0247 -0.0184 0.1333*** 
  
Observations 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.112 
Log Likelihood -644.6 -644.6 -644.6 -633.5 
Note: All  variables refer to 2012, except for f inancial l i teracy (to 2008) and preference for short run 
(to 2010). Robust standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Average Marginal Effects; Base 
Outcome: 3 (RIA). 
 
5.1. Robustness checks and alternative specification of the ELM variables 
Several robustness checks of the results of Table 8 were conducted, which we briefly summarize 
here (details are available upon request). First we updated the 2006-2012 balanced panel with the last 
release of the 2014 SHIW data. This leads to a huge reduction (about 34%) in the size of our balanced 
panel because of attrition. Moreover, the attrition leads to a sample with higher education, more 
household income level, and higher financial literacy, making it less representative of the population 
that we aim to analyse. Despite this, all results remain practically unchanged except that the effect of 
financial literacy on following a CR becomes less significant (only at 10% level). 
We tried different specifications of some of the controls: a quadratic specification for age (instead of 
age classes), quadratic specifications for income and wealth (instead of quintile dummies), and 
dummies for household size (instead of the cardinal variable itself). All results in Table 8 remain 
essentially the same in these alternative specifications. In order to verify the robustness of the 
significance of financial literacy, we also replaced the financial literacy dummy (at least two correct 
answers) by the number of correct answers and by separate dummies for each of the three questions. 
Secondly, we removed education, household income, wealth, and company size variables. In both 
checks, financial literacy remains significant and of the same sign. 
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We also tested for the robustness of the results to the specifications of the two main variables in the 
ELM scheme, using different proxies for the ability to process and motivation. To define ability to 
process, we found that the one used in the previous sections (i.e. two correct answers out of four) is the 
best one; requiring a higher number of correct answers (3 instead of 2) reduces the number of 
employees following a CR from 86 to 46 and does not substantially change the estimation results. For 
motivation, we considered four alternatives for the variable on recalling the choice of Tfr transfer in 
2012 that was used in our benchmark models: age, the expected replacement rate, and preference for 
short period investing.10 As for age, since the Tfr reform aims to benefit younger employees we 
expected them to be more interested in the communication, but the age patterns of reform knowledge 
and reported Tfr choice show that this is not the case, suggesting that age is not a valid proxy for 
motivation. As for the expected replacement rate, we define as motivated only those employees who 
both recall their Tfr choice and have an expected replacement rate lower than 75%. Although this 
definition reduces the number of employees following a CR from 86 to 50, most results remain 
unchanged – except that financial literacy still raises the probability to take a conscious decision, but is 
not significant anymore for following a CR. 
Finally, since the Tfr transfer choice can be seen as a choice between a lump sum and an annuity, 
we considered as a proxy for motivation the combination between recalling the 2012 Tfr choice and the 
preference for short period investing. Also this definition leads to a decrease in the number of CR 
followers (from 86 to 61), but results still remain unchanged except for the effect of education – this is 
no longer significantly associated with the probability to follow a CR. All in all, we find no reason to 
deviate from the simple proxy of motivation only based upon recalling the 2012 Tfr transfer choice. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the heterogeneity in pension choices through the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
of the elaboration process that occurs when there is an attempt to change a person’s attitude through 
communication. When motivation and ability to process are high, individuals are inclined to follow a 
“central route to persuasion”, otherwise they follow a “peripheral route to persuasion”. The ELM has 
often been used in marketing studies for assessing the effectiveness of advertisement on consumers’ 
choices. As far as we know this paper represents the first attempt to use it to investigate a pension 
choice. 
In particular, we use ELM in order to analyse the choices connected to the 2007 Italian reform that 
allowed transferring future severance pay’s contributions into a pension fund. The aim is not to assess 
the optimality of the choice, but rather how individuals process the message they receive and the 
ultimate effectiveness of the communication. The reform was accompanied by an information campaign 
with a clear message that resembled an advertisement in favour of transferring to a pension fund. We 
use data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), including a question 
on the severance pay’s transfer choice. We combine information from four waves: one before (2006) 
and three after the reform (2008, 2010 and 2012) and focus on changes in pension fund participation 
between 2006 and 2012.  
Preliminary descriptive evidence shows that the decision to transfer the Tfr into a pension fund was 
taken by more educated and older individuals, wealthy and with high household income. However, 
those who, according to the reform informational campaign, would have benefitted most from the Tfr 
transfer are low income and young employees. It appears that these latter groups have less often 
received or understood the message of the reform, inducing them not to transfer their severance pay 
and not to participate in a pension fund. This evidence calls for a better understanding of the type of 
elaboration process fostered by the reform and its communication campaign.  
                                                  
10 We did not use the time-to-retirement since the variable is missing for some employees. 
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To this end, we frame our research question in the traditional ELM scheme, where the starting point 
is the definition of the message proposed by the Government with this reform. Relying on many 
different sources (literature, publications and media), we synthetize it as follows: “Pension funds plus 
tax incentives linked to them can guarantee a higher retirement income, compared to the severance 
pay (Tfr)”. Then we use the SHIW data to assess whether the employee has the involvement (or 
motivation), and the necessary ability to process the message in order to assign one of the three 
possible ELM outcomes to each individual: I) decision reached via a central route; II) decision reached 
via a peripheral route; III) retaining the initial attitude.  
An alternative classification of the ELM outcome can be used recalling that, in our analysis, by 
consciousness of the decision we mean a decision based on motivation and ability to process 
independently of the decision outcome provided that, in case of a change in pension fund participation, 
the latter is enduring. Thus, since among those who retain their initial attitude some did it consciously, 
an alternative association is between individuals and consciousness/unconsciousness of the decision.  
To evaluate the impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of employees on the 
probability to follow a specific ELM route or to take a conscious decision, we estimated a Multinomial 
Logit Model for the three ELM outcomes and a binary Logit Model for the consciousness of decision. 
Main results from this analysis are: Individuals working in small companies have a much lower 
probability to follow a CR and a higher probability to retain their (generally negative) initial attitude, 
possibly because their employers would in case of Tfr transfer lose a cheap source of financing or 
because they got less information on the reform content (due to the absence of unions in small firms). 
High household incomes are associated with a higher probability of deciding consciously, and a lower 
probability of retaining the initial attitude; having a high risk aversion reduces the probability of being 
influenced, while financial literacy is statistically significant in taking a conscious decision. Our analysis 
highlights that, beside financial literacy, other elements played a relevant role in the employees’ 
elaboration process, such as the individual’s comprehension of the specific issue (ability to process), 
the personal relevance of the choice (motivation), cognitive skills, and contextual elements (e.g. unions, 
employer pressure).  
Our results help understanding why the message of the informational campaign of the 2007 reform 
was not as successful as expected, since the objective was a higher increase in pension fund 
participation than the one actually recorded after the reform. Thus our results have useful policy 
implications for the effectiveness of communication in the pension domain. For example, one can think 
of providing more information and/or educational material on the specific choice together with the form 
to be filled given that a media campaign does not guarantee enough proximity between the message 
communication and the exact moment the choice is taken. Moreover, based on the evidence we have 
for the case of small firms, which are less unionized and provide less information to their employees 
than large firms, it seems that the way in which the choice process is organized may have a negative 
effect. Employees fill out the form and make their decisions in the workplace, in the proximity of the 
employer. This makes the Tfr transfer decision particularly susceptible for contextual elements. 
Changing the choice architecture might well be a more efficient way to stimulate the Tfr transfer than a 
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Table A.1 – SHIW variables description (all variables refer to 2012 except when specified differently) 
Variables Description 
Dependent variables  
ELM outcomes  
Multinomial variable which can assume three values that cannot be ordered 
and represent the possible ELM outcomes (CR, PR, or RIA)  
Decision consciousness Binary variable which is equal to 1 if decision is conscious and 0 otherwise 
Control variables  
Female Binary variable taking value 1 for female, 0 for male. 
Age < 35 
Age 35-45 
Age 45-55 
Binary variables representing the age group of employees. The reference 
category is Age ≥ 55. 
Married Binary variable taking value 1 for married employees, and 0 otherwise.  
High school 
University 
Binary variables representing the highest education level achieved. The 








Binary variables representing the size of the municipality of residence. The 
reference category is Medium municipality (number of inhabitants between 
20.000 and 40.000). 
No. household 
components 
Discrete variable representing the number of household components. When 
the household members are more than 5, it takes value 5. 
No. Employees ≤ 15 
15 < No. Employees < 50 
Employees ≥ 100 
Binary variables representing the company size. The reference category is 
50 < No. Employees < 100. 
Medium income 
High income 
Binary variables representing the household income quintile. Medium income 
is the third quintile, while High income represents fourth and fifth ones. The 
reference category is Low income (first and second quintile). 
Medium wealth 
High wealth  
Binary variables representing the household wealth quintile. Medium wealth is 
the third quintile, while High wealth represents fourth and fifth ones. The 
reference category is Low wealth (first and second quintile). 
High risk aversion 
Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who declared to prefer an 
investment with low or fair returns, but also with no risk or a good degree of 
protection for the invested capital. 
Preference for short run 
Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who declared that if they won a 
lottery where the prize is equal to the annual household disposable income 
and it is postponed by a year, then they would give up to at least 10% of this 
prize to receive it immediately; 0 otherwise. The question about individual 
preference for short period is collected in the 2010 survey. 
Financial literacy 
Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who correctly answered to at 
least two out of the three questions discussed in Section 3, 0 otherwise. The 





CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
CEFIN Working Papers ISSN (online) 2282-8168 
 
61 The Risk-Asymmetry Index, by Elyasiani, E., Gambarelli L. and Muzzioli, S.(December 2016)  
60 Strumenti per il sostegno finanziario di famiglie e microimprese: il caso italiano (Policies to 
help financially vulnerable Italian households and micro-businesses),  
by Cotterli, S. (December 2016)  
59 A test of the Behavioral versus the Rational model of Persuasion in Financial Advertising, 
by Ferretti, R., Pancotto, F. and Rubaltelli, E. (May 2016)  
58 Financial connectedness among European volatility risk premia, 
by Cipollini, A., Lo Cascio, I. and Muzzioli, S. (December 2015)  
57 The effectiveness of insider trading regulations. The case of the Italian tender offers, 
by Ferretti, R., Pattitoni, P. and Salinas, A. (September 2015)  
56 Introducing Aggregate Return on Investment as a Solution for the Contradiction between 
some PME Metrics and IRR, by Altshuler D. and Magni, C.A. (September 2015)  
55 ‘It’s a trap!’ The degree of poverty persistence in Italy and Europe, by Giarda, E. and  
Moroni, G. (September 2015)  
54 Systemic risk measures and macroprudential stress tests. An assessment over the 2014 
EBA exercise. by Pederzoli, C. and Torricelli,C.  (July 2015)  
53 Emotional intelligence and risk taking in investment decision-making, by Rubaltelli, E., 
Agnoli, S., Rancan, M.and Pozzoli, T. (July 2015)  
52 Second homes: households’ life dream or wrong investment?, By Brunetti, M. and 
Torricelli, C. (May  2015)  
51 Pseudo-naïve approaches to investment performance measurement, by Magni, C.A.  
(February, 2015)  
50 Monitoring systemic risk. A survey of the available macroprudential Toolkit, by  
Gualandri, E. and Noera, M. (November 2014).  
49 Towards a macroprudential policy in the EU: Main issues, by Gualandri, E. and 
 Noera, M. (November 2014).  
48 Does homeownership partly explain low participation in supplementary pension  
schemes?, by Santantonio, M., Torricelli, C., and Urzì Brancati M.C.,  (September 2014)
47 An average-based accounting approach to capital asset investments: The case of project finance,  
by Magni, C.A. (September 2014) 
 
46 Should football coaches wear a suit? The impact of skill and management structure on Serie A  
Clubs’ performance, by Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C., and Mirtoleni, L. (July 2014) 
 
45 Family ties: occupational responses to cope with a household income shock, by Baldini, M., 
Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C. (April 2014) 
 
44 Volatility co-movements: a time scale decomposition analysis, by Cipollini, I., Lo Cascio I.,   
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
Muzzioli. S. (November 2013) 
43 The effect of revenue and geographic diversification on bank performance, by Brighi, P.,  
Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
 
42 The sovereign debt crisis: the impact on the intermediation model of Italian banks, by Cosma,S., 
Gualandri, E. (October 2013)  
 
 
41 The financing of Italian firms and the credit crunch: findings and exit strategies,  
by Gualandri, E., Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
40 Efficiency and unbiasedness of corn futures markets: New evidence across the financial crisis, by 
Pederzoli, C., Torricelli, C. (October 2013)  
39 La regolamentazione dello short selling: effetti sul mercato azionario italiano (Short selling ban:  
effects on the Italian stock market), by Mattioli L., Ferretti R. (August 2013) 
38 A liquidity risk index as a regulatory tool for systematically important banks? An empirical  
assessment across two financial crises, by Gianfelice G., Marotta G., Torricelli C. (July 2013)  
37 Per un accesso sostenibile delle Pmi al credito (A sustainable access to credit for SMEs),  
by Marotta, G. (May 2013) 
36 The unavoidable persistence of forum shopping in the Insolvency Regulation, by  
Mucciarelli, F.M. (April 2013) 
35 Rating Triggers, Market Risk and the Need for More Regulation, by Parmeggiani, F. 
(December 2012) 
34 Collateral Requirements of SMEs: The Evidence from Less–Developed Countries,  
by Hanedar, E.H.  Broccardo, E. and Bazzana, F. (November 2012) 
33 Is it money or brains? The determinants of intra-family decision power, by Bertocchi, G.,  
Brunetti, M. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
32 Is financial fragility a matter of illiquidity? An appraisal for Italian households, by Brunetti, M,  
Giarda, E. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
31 Attitudes, personality factors and household debt decisions: A study of consumer credit,  
by Stefano Cosma and Francesco Pattarin (February 2012) 
30 Corridor implied volatility and the variance risk premium in the Italian market,  
by Silvia Muzzioli (November 2011) 
29 Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks,  
Regulators and Supervisors, by Gualandri, E., Stanziale, A. and Mangone, E. (November 2011) 
28 Are  defined contribution pension schemes socially sustainable? A conceptual  
map from a macroprudential perspective, by Marotta, G. (October 2011) 
27 Basel 3, Pillar 2: the role of banks’ internal governance and control function, by  
Gualandri, E. (September 2011) 
26 Underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going 
public: the role of private equity backing in Italian IPOs, by Ferretti, R.  and Meles, 
A. (April 2011) 
25 Modelling credit risk for innovative firms: the role of innovation measures, by 
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
Pederzoli C., Thoma G., Torricelli C. (March 2011) 
24 Market Reaction to Second-Hand News: Attention Grabbing or Information 
Dissemination?, by Cervellati E.M., Ferretti R., Pattitoni P. (January 2011) 
23 Towards a volatility index for the Italian stock market, by Muzzioli S. (September 
2010) 
22 A parsimonious default prediction model for Italian SMEs, by Pederzoli C., 
Torricelli C. (June 2010) 
21 Average Internal Rate of Return and investment decisions: a new perspective, by 
Magni C.A. (February 2010) 
20 The skew pattern of implied volatility in the DAX index options market, by Muzzioli 
S. (December 2009) 
19 Accounting and economic measures: An integrated theory of capital budgeting, by 
Magni C.A. (December 2009) 
18 Exclusions of US-holders in cross-border takeover bids and the principle of 
equality in tender offers, by Mucciarelli F. (May 2009).  
17 Models for household portfolios and life-cycle allocations in the presence of labour 
income and longevity risk, by Torricelli C. (March 2009)  
16 Differential evolution of combinatorial search for constrained index tracking, by 
Paterlini S, Krink T, Mittnik S. (March 2009)  
15 Optimization heuristics for determining internal rating grading scales, by Paterlini 
S, Lyraa M, Pahaa J, Winker P. (March 2009)  
14 The impact of bank concentration on financial distress: the case of the European 
banking system, by Fiordelisi F, Cipollini A. (February 2009)  
13 Financial crisis and new dimensions of liquidity risk: rethinking prudential 
regulation and supervision, by Landi A, Gualandri E, Venturelli V. (January 2009)  
12 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area: a data-driven tale, by Marotta 
G. (October 2008)  
11 Option based forecast of volatility: an empirical study in the Dax index options 
market, Muzzioli S. (May 2008)  
10 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area, by Marotta G. (March 2008) 
9 Indebtedness, macroeconomic conditions and banks’ losses: evidence from Italy, 
by Torricelli C, Castellani S, Pederzoli C. (January 2008)  
8 Is public information really public? The role of newspapers, Ferretti R, Pattarin F. 
(January 2008)  
7 Differential evolution of multi-objective portfolio optimization, by Paterlini S, Krink 
T. (January 2008) 
6 Assessing and measuring the equity gap and the equity, by Gualandri E, 
Venturelli V. (January 2008)  
5 Model risk e tecniche per il controllo dei market parameter, Torricelli C, Bonollo M, 
Morandi D, Pederzoli C. (October 2007) 
4 The relations between implied and realised volatility, are call options more 
informative than put options? Evidence from the Dax index options market, by 
Muzzioli S. (October 2007) 
3 The maximum LG-likelihood method: an application to extreme quantile 
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
estimation in finance, by Ferrari D., Paterlini S. (June 2007)  
2 Default risk: Poisson mixture and the business cycle, by Pederzoli C. (June 2007)  
1 Population ageing, household portfolios and financial asset returns: a survey of 
the literature, by Brunetti M. (May 2007)  
 
